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which reasonable men at the time may have entertained a substantial
doubt. In Forsythe v. Rexroat,16 the court added to the confusion
surrounding the application of the doubtful rule by stating it is not
essential that the claim "be set up in particular terms sufficient to
withstand a demurrer."'
With such inconsistent views of what constitutes a reasonable
claim, certainly the doubtful rule is not easier to apply If these views
were crystalized into one standard, the doubtful rule would be less
difficult to apply Nevertheless, the reasonableness of the claim should
not be questioned. A court should be satisfied that the claun which
was withheld was reasonable because of the fact that the adverse
party respected it enough to enter into the contract. The only question
which should be presented to the court is whether the claim was in
fact asserted in good faith. Under this rule, the reasonableness of the
claim will necessarily become one of the factors in determining the
good faith of the claimant.
The other reason urged in support of the doubtful rule is that it
will prevent vexatious or fraudulent claims. However, there would be
no practical difference if the good faith only rule were applied. These
claims are, per se, not in good faith. By the use of this test the court
in the principal case would have achieved the same result since the
court indicated that the clann was treated seriously by all parties
concerned, including their lawyers, and that the claim was of more
than nuisance value.
Charles Samuel Whitehead
EvIDyENCE-REs GEsTA-Tmm ELEmrm r iN RAP.-The prosecutrix and
her husband lived in a remote section of the state. Upon arving
home one day with his employer, the husband found his wife visibly
nervous and excited. She told them she had been raped about an
hour before their arrival. This was her first opportunity to tell anyone,
and she told them immediately The trial court admitted the
employers testimony as substantive evidence and also permitted a
police officer to read into the record a statement which the prosecutrix
made to him about six hours after the event. Defendant appealed
from the conviction for rape. Held: Reversed. While the employers
testimony is properly admissible as part of the res gestae,1 the testi-
16234 Ky. 173, 27 S.W.2d 695 (1929).
17 Id. at 178, 27 S.W.2d at 698.
1 Technically, this statement is dictum, but for all practical purposes it is
holding.
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mony of the officer clearly is not within the res gestae, and its
admission constitutes reversible error. Cook v. Commonwealth, 351
S.W.2d 187 (Ky 1961).
Literally translated, res gestae means "things done." The ambigu-
ties lurking behind this phrase have invited considerable criticism.
To one writer, res gestae is "the lurking place of a motley crowd of
conceptions in mutual conflict and reciprocating chaos."2 To another,
res gestae represents a substitute for reasoning-a term used to cloud
the simple issue of whether an exception to the hearsay rule should
be made.3 Learned Hand has termed it "a phrase which has been
accountable for so much confusion that it had best be denied any
place whatever in legal terminology" 4 The antagonistic attitude of
legal writers was classically expressed by Wigmore:
The phrase res gestae has long been not only entirely useless,
but even positively harmful. It is useless, because every rule of
Evidence to which it has ever been applied exists as a part of some
other well-established principle and can be explained in terms of that
principle. It is harmful, because by its ambiguity it invites the con-
fusion of one rule with another and thus creates uncertainty as to the
limitations of both. It ought therefore wholly to be repudiated, as a
vicious element in our legal phraseology.5
Res gestae is most frequently and probably most accurately applied
to the "spontaneous exclamations" doctrine.6 It is in this context that
it is encountered in the principal case. The reason for admitting
spontaneous utterances is as easy to comprehend as it is difficult to
apply.
The basis for the admission of declarations under the res gestae
rule is the well-founded belief that statements made instinctively at
the time of a specific transaction or event, without the opportunity
for formulation of statements favorable to ones own cause, are likely
to cast important light upon the matter in issue; as to such statements,
the law creates a presumption of their truthfulness. The factual
situation in each case will largely determine the extent to which the
court will apply this rule. The marked trend of the decisions is to
extend, rather than narrow, the scope of the doctrine. 7
Following this trend, the principle case contains a notable extension
for Kentucky While the court refused to admit the testimony of the
2 Stone, Res Gesta Reagitata, 55 L.Q. Rev. 66, 67 (1939).
3 Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Adrmssible as Res Gestae,
31 Yale L.J. 229 (1922).
4 United States v. Matet, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944).
5 6 Wigmore, Evidence §1767 (3d ed. 1940). But see Annot., 163 A.L.R.
15, 20 (1946), where it is asserted: "In the vast area of situations in which the
term res gestae is appropriate, it denotes a distinct principle of admissibility."
6 For further applications of the phrase, see 6 Wigmore, op cit, supra note 5,
§1768.
720 Am. Jur. Etndence §663 (1939).
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officer to whom the prosecutrix made her statement six hours after the
act, it indicated that the admission of the employers testimony
relating what the prosecutrix told him one hour after was not error.
That an hour is not so long as to preclude spontaneity as a matter of
law may appear absurd at first glance, but a further examination of
the doctrine should be conducted before a conclusion is reached.
The test for spontaneity is whether there has been opportunity for
fabrication following the termination of the emotional sway of the
event.8 Notwithstanding the practical difficulty in applying it, the
spontaneity test is generally used in Kentucky 9 Within this test, the
Court of Appeals has considered the type of event involved, in addition
to the time element, in determining whether an exclamation should
be admitted as spontaneous. While the principal case allows state-
ments made an hour after the event to be admitted as spontaneous in
a rape situation, it has been held that statements made by a seriously
wounded man within five minutes after the fight are not within the
res gestae.10 Regardless of the seemmg inconsistency, the principal
case follows the trend in allowing a more lenient rule in rape cases
than is usually permitted m other situations. In sex crime cases a
time lapse of up to an hour will not necessarily preclude admissibility
if spontaneity can be found; beyond an hour it is virtually never
found.ii
The reason courts are more lement in sex crime cases can be found
in the following text:
[Tihe condition of the victim at the time of the particular
utterance is a very important factor. The fact that she was dazed,
excited, hystencal, bruised, or disheveled at the time of her utterances
as to the alleged offense, has been noted in practically every case
wherein such utterances were held admissible as part of the res
gestae. On the other band, the absence of such circumstances has
been particularly stressed in the cases wherein such declarations
were held not a part of the res gestae.12
Apparently there is a widespread belief that sex victims suffer
emotional effects for an extended duration, and that their utterances
can be trusted for some time after the act.
8 Ibnd. But see Thayer, Bedingfleld's Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res
Gesta, 15 Am. L. Rev. 71 (1881), where the approach taken requires contem-
poraneity of the utterance and the act. A statement such as the one in the pnn-
cipal case, made an hour afterwards, certainly is not contemporaneous.
9Castle v. Allen, 274 Ky. 658, 120 S.W.2d 219 (1938); Brandenburg v.
Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 70, 83 S.W.2d 862 (1935); Norton s Adm r v. Winstead,
218 Ky. 488, 291 S.W 723 (1927). But see Kentucky Util. Co. v. Consolidated
Tel. Co., 252 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1952).10 Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 729, 29 S.W.2d 11 (1930); accord,
Philpot v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 555, 242 S.W 839 (1922).
11 Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 579 (1951).
12 20 Am. Jur. Etndence §670.5 (Supp. 1962).
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By disallowing the testimony of the officer, Kentucky follows the
nearly umversal rule based on the common sense belief that statements
made as much as six hours after the act almost always lack spontaneity
in the sense of arising from and being prompted by the act. By
allowing the testimony of the employer, Kentucky follows the current
trend of decisions in this limited type of res gestae situation. This is
the first time the Kentucky court has been confronted with so close
a situation.13 It may be argued that Kentucky has extended the
doctrine too far, but when a trial court is satisfied, as it was in the
principal case, that the evidence of spontaneity is sufficient under the
circumstances, ordinarily its exercise of discretion should not be
disturbed.14
Terrence R. Fitzgerald
TORTS-PAxENTAL LLmmrrY FOR Tm INTENTIoNAL TORT OF MiNoR
Camr-Plamtiff brought action for damages against parents of minor
children who had allegedly committed assault and battery De-
fendants sons allegedly pursued plaintiff in an automobile, forced him
to stop, dragged hin from his automobile and injured him to the
extent that he was hospitalized. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants
knew their sons had dangerous tendencies of a malicious nature;
that by lack of parental discipline they failed to prevent their sons
from beating others; and that because of this negligence plaintiff was
injured. One defendant imposed a demurrer, which was sustained.
The plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed and remanded. A cause of
action is stated by alleging that defendants knew their sons had
inflicted injuries on other boys, and that defendants were negligent in
failing to exercise parental authority over their sons, thus making
plaintiffs injuries possible. Bieker v. Owens, 350 S.W.2d 522 (Ark.
1961).
The common law rule is that a parent is not liable for the torts
of his minor child.' Three exceptions are made to this rule: (1) when
the parent employs the child and the child commits a tort in the
course of employment, (2) when the parent participates in the
13 Res gestae in sex crimes is a limited field. The closest Kentucky cases on
this point are Hopper v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 655, 225 S.W.2d 100 (1949)
(statements made several days after the event held inadmissible) and Cornwell v.
Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1956) (utterances made a few minutes
after the act held admissible).
'4 In State v. Finley, 85 Arz. 327, 338 P.2d 790, 794 (1959), the court said
that "each case must depend upon its own facts and much must be left to the
sound discretion of the trial court."
1Prosser, Torts §101 (2d ed. 1955).
